The fall of the Assad regime in Syria, followed by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entering Damascus and taking over state institutions, has sparked intense debates in recent months both in academic International Relations and in policy-oriented discussions. Sardar Nasrullayev’s article, “Syria: The Chessboard of U.S. and Russian Influence in the Middle East,” represents a valuable contribution to this debate. The author frames Syria as a geopolitical arena where two major powers, the United States and Russia, compete for influence. Drawing on historical evidence, he emphasizes that the December 8 HTS coup marked a Turkish victory and a Russian loss.

Yet, when we examine the Syrian case through both local, regional, and global lenses, the question of what perspective and analytical framework we should adopt remains a difficult one. As Hegel famously remarked, “The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.” Syria, however, is still at the dawn of new and unpredictable developments. If the discipline of International Relations tries to fly too early, the brightness of dawn may blind rather than illuminate. Still, this does not mean we should limit ourselves to chronicling events in a Rankean positivist fashion, “how things actually are.” The hallmark of International Relations lies in situating daily developments within the broader interplay of domestic and external actors, institutions, and strategic objectives. Nasrullayev indeed attempts to do so. My critique in this article does not concern his use of data, but rather the arguments and perspectives he derives from it. I will first summarize his main claims, then examine the internal consistency of his argument and the analytical framework he constitutes. Finally, I will suggest how the issue might be reframed from a different perspective. The purpose here is not to dismiss his contribution, but to foster a broader discussion on a subject that is marked by dynamic interactions and historical turning points. It is only through such debate, where authors and readers alike engage with competing perspectives, that genuinely creative thoughts can emerge.

The author begins by explaining Syria’s role in the tense historical relationship between the United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union). Syria’s status as a key player in the Levant, its control over access to the Mediterranean, and its border with Turkey—one of NATO’s closest members to the Soviet frontier—made the country a significant target for both Washington and Moscow.

The wave of Arab nationalism sweeping the region in the 1950s marked a major turning point in these dynamics. The 1963 Ba’athist coup pulled Syria even closer into the Soviet orbit. However, one of the most common mistakes in historical analysis is to treat Hafez al-Assad’s Syria as mere Soviet proxies. At the outset of the Cold War, Muslim societies were generally divided into two camps: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Morocco built their security architectures under U.S. guidance, while Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq tended to lean on Soviet policies. The primary unifying idea among Arab societies was the belief that Israel was not a legitimate state. Yet the stalemate that followed the 1973 Yom Kippur War prompted Egypt to shift closer to the U.S. orbit. Anwar Sadat switched sides and became a de facto U.S. ally. Syria, concluded a disengagement agreement with Israel in 1974 and began adopting a more equidistant stance between the two blocs.

Another major turning point, as the author notes, was the Arab Spring. The social upheavals that began in Egypt and Tunisia quickly spread across the region. The events that unfolded in Syria in 2011 created tensions in both its internal politics and its inter-state relations. The exposure of Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons and the subsequent strain on Syria’s ties with regional and global powers created a productive environment for many actors.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which briefly seized power in Egypt, anticipated a similar outcome in Syria. Arab tribes, long neutralized under Hafez al-Assad’s secular rule, sought ways to reconsolidate their power. ISIS, which considered any form of terror and violence legitimate in its quest to realize the dream of an “Islamic Caliphate,” began mobilizing to exploit the chaos. Sunni communities organized to seize these opportunities, but they were not the only ones preparing for action. The Kurdish population in Syria’s northeast began mobilizing both to defend themselves against ISIS and to pursue their separatist aspirations of autonomy projects. The Druzites also initiated self-organization to protect themselves from attacks by both jihadist groups and the Assad regime. Equally important, the Alawite and Nusayri communities, who had long benefited from the privileges of being the ruling class, mobilized through Iranian proxies to ensure the survival of their regime. As Syria’s sovereignty weakened and the legitimacy of the regime sharply declined, Assad faced a dual crisis: internal and external disorder.

Internal political disorder stemmed from the constellation of social actors described above, while external disorder resulted from the maneuvers of regional and global powers.

The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Turkey; Russia; Iran; Israel; the U.S.; the European Union; and other powers each invested in different groups based on their interests and visions for order. Russia, unlike the others, focused not on non-state actors but on strengthening the sovereignty of the regime in power. Iran fought against forces opposing Assad by supporting groups such as Hezbollah and Hashd al-Shaabi. The Gulf states provided financial and logistical support to Sunni forces to counterbalance Iran’s influence and promote their own official narratives. The United States, however, lacked a clear vision for Syria. Historically speaking, England, after positioning itself as a hegemonic power post-1815, similarly avoided rigid foreign policy commitments. It usually acted after a situation had materialized, in order to maintain balance. In 1841, then-Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston emphasized that “it is not usual for England to enter into engagements with references to cases which have not actually arisen, or which are not immediately in prospect.” U.S. policy toward Syria, as Nasrullayev implies, did not emerge as a derivative or direct consequence of superpower competition but rather developed reactively, as events unfolded. If we imagine Syria as a chessboard, as the article’s title suggests, the U.S. had not prepared its pieces for development in advance; it merely moved its pawns back and forth. The catalyst for serious engagement was ISIS’s near-total takeover of Syria after conquering much of Iraq. In 2014, the U.S. allied with Kurdish groups, launching airstrikes to break ISIS sieges. By 2016, after ISIS offensives were repelled, the intensity of Syria’s turmoil had begun to subside and the fog was slowly lifting.

The Assad regime’s legitimacy was perhaps at its weakest point ever, but despite heavy losses, it had managed to survive. Sovereignty was fragmented: opposition forces were confined to Idlib, PKK-linked YPG/SDG declared autonomy in the northeast, and Damascus along with its surrounding areas remained under Assad loyalists’ control. At this point, the Astana Process was launched to establish a new status quo.

After 2016, a relative status quo had emerged, with sovereignty divided between opposition forces and loyalists. The chain of events that fundamentally shifted the regional balance began on October 7, 2023. Following Hamas’s attack on Israel, Israel adopted an increasingly hawkish military posture. As the author notes, Israel’s precision strikes on Iranian officials in Syria and its dismantling of Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon disrupted the regional equilibrium. However, Sardar Nasrullayev’s claim that “Following a significant decline in international support for Syrian government forces…” contradicts his earlier statement that “…the Arab League restored Syria’s membership in the organization.” In fact, Syria’s regional legitimacy was increasing after 2023. On June 28, 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that they could meet with Assad: “There is no reason not to reestablish diplomatic relations with Syria. We have done it before, and we can do it again. We have no intention of interfering in Syria’s internal affairs. As you know, we used to meet with Mr. Assad, even as families, so there is no reason we cannot do so again.” Following this, during a press briefing on his return flight from Germany to Istanbul on July 6, Erdoğan added: “The moment Bashar al-Assad takes a step toward normalizing relations with Turkey, we will reciprocate. After all, we were not enemies of Syria in the past — we used to meet with Assad as families.” Bashar al-Assad’s readmission into the Arab League in May 2023 marked a paradigm shift in the region’s approach to Syria. The normalization steps taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE prompted the EU to reconsider its Syria strategy. In response to requests from at least eight member states to reengage with Syria in order to encourage refugee returns, the European Commission announced that it was preparing to appoint a Special Representative for Syria.

In the aftermath of October 7, the Assad government sought to avoid becoming either an instrument or a staging ground for Iran’s confrontation with Israel. With encouragement from Moscow, logistical and militant support from Iran to Lebanon was curtailed. Russia advised the Assad regime to remain neutral during this period and specifically counseled Damascus to avoid actions that could make it a direct target of Israel. Contrary to the author’s assertion, Syria was not rendered a primary target by international powers during this phase. Its legitimacy did not diminish; on the contrary, Damascus began to re-engage and sit once again at the table with regional actors. However, the offensive launched by opposition forces on November 27 ultimately succeeded for a variety of reasons, culminating in Assad’s flight to Russia and the transfer of power to the opposition.

A fundamental issue with Nasrullayev’s argument is his attempt to interpret regional transformations through the lens of a zero-sum game. In reality, Middle Eastern politics are predominantly shaped by a complex interplay of multi-layered interests, transient coalitions, and simultaneous cooperation-conflict dynamics. The fact that Turkey or the United States might derive benefits from a particular development does not automatically imply a corresponding loss for Russia. Indeed, Ankara-Moscow relations over the past decade have demonstrated a multidimensional pattern, encompassing both intense competition and strategic cooperation. The Astana process and the Sochi agreements illustrate that this bilateral relationship has operated effectively not only in the military domain but also on the diplomatic plane.

Moreover, it has been asserted, most notably by Mihraç Ural, a figure closely aligned with the Assad regime and Maher al-Assad, that Russia played a role in facilitating the ascendancy of HTS. The HTS leadership, in turn, has exhibited pragmatic behavior, avoiding overt confrontation with Moscow and signaling openness to cooperation on multiple fronts. Russia’s continued presence in Syria is thus rational from the U.S. perspective as well, as it can serve a balancing function between Israel and Iran, contributing to broader regional stability.

Similarly, construing the United States’ regional presence solely as a long-term strategy focused on countering China is analytically insufficient. Washington’s engagement in the Middle East is not merely driven by a desire to weaken Russia in the context of great power competition; ensuring Israel’s security, safeguarding energy flows in the Gulf, and constraining Iran’s regional influence remain central priorities of U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, American policies in the Syrian context should be understood not only through the lens of global strategic competition but also as responses to direct regional security imperatives.

At this juncture, it is instructive to employ historical analogies frequently utilized in international relations scholarship. Nasrullayev’s analysis, which centers the U.S.–Russia rivalry, overlooks the primary determinants of Middle Eastern dynamics. The principal contestation is occurring not among great powers but between regional actors themselves. The divergent historical visions of Israel and Turkey are particularly evident in their respective strategic approaches to Syria.

Netanyahu’s approach can be analogized to Cardinal Richelieu’s raison d’état.

During the seventeenth century, in the context of the Protestant Wars, France prioritized state interests over religious motivations to prevent the Habsburgs from consolidating into a unified power, thereby promoting a fragmented and weakened Central Europe. Similarly, Israel favors a demilitarized, fragmented Syria that does not pose a threat to its security. This approach mirrors the dynamics that ultimately culminated in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, producing a fragmented regional order while safeguarding Israel’s strategic security interests.

Turkey’s regional vision can be interpreted as a pursuit of a “Congress of Vienna for the Middle East.” More accurately, however, this vision can be understood through the lens of the Metternich system. In post-1815 Europe, the order established by Austrian Chancellor Metternich sought to prevent the hegemonic dominance of a single power by maintaining different actors within a continuous balance of power. Similarly, Ankara envisions a regional order not composed of fragmented and weak states, but of actors that are mutually balancing while remaining open to cooperative engagement. President Erdoğan’s frequently articulated call for an “Arab–Kurdish–Turkish alliance” can be seen as a concrete manifestation of this neo-Metternich vision. From Turkey’s perspective, regional actors should neither be completely fragmented and demilitarized, as Israel desires, nor centralized to the extent that they could directly challenge Ankara’s interests, as was the case under the Baath regime. Instead, in line with the Metternich system, Turkey seeks a controlled distribution of power based on balance and cooperation.

Turkey’s vision for Syria can also be partially interpreted through the concept of “Finlandization.” During the Cold War, Finland maintained its political independence and democratic system while carefully avoiding foreign policy decisions that would contravene Soviet interests. Similarly, Ankara recognizes Syria’s formal sovereignty, but seeks a Syria that is responsive to Turkey’s security interests and, in some respects, partially dependent on Ankara. This vision rejects both the complete disintegration of Syria and the demilitarization sought by Israel, while also resisting a scenario in which Syria becomes powerful enough to challenge Turkey. Thus, the concept of a “Finlandization of Syria” provides a useful analogy for Turkey’s desired balance: a neighbor that appears independent but remains attentive to Turkey on critical security matters.